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This paper investigates the wage-setting behaviour of Irish firms. We place particular 
emphasis on the use of flexible pay components and examine how these allow firms 
to deal with shocks requiring a reduction in costs without having to cut base wages.   
The results presented in this paper are based on a survey of Irish firms undertaken as 
part of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), which is a Euro-system research 
network.  Our main findings are that almost two-thirds of firms applied at least some 
elements of the national wage agreement in place at the time of the survey (Towards 
2016).  Wage cuts or freezes were reported by a very small percentage of firms but 
changes in bonuses and other flexible pay components were relatively common if the 
firm needed to reduce labour costs.  When asked about the relevance of different 
explanations for avoiding cuts in base wages, worker morale and loss of experienced 
workers were the main concerns. Regulatory or collective bargaining obstacles to 
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The results presented in this paper are based on a survey of almost 1000 Irish firms 
undertaken as part of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), which is a Euro-system 
research network. The survey was motivated by a general lack of information on wage 
and price adjustment at firm level, and, in particular, the lack of consistent cross-
country information. The aim of the survey is to identify the sources and 
characteristics of wage and labour cost dynamics that are most significant for policy 
makers and central banks, as wages account for a significant proportion of production 
costs for most goods and services.  
 
The paper is concerned with the results of the Irish component of this Eurosystem 
survey. The Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland carried out this 
coordinated survey of wage setting in Ireland in late 2007 and early 2008 and the 
results should be interpreted in the context of the stronger economic climate at that 
time.  The survey contained questions on wage-setting practices and the role of any 
wage-bargaining processes. As Towards 2016 was the National Wage Agreement in 
place at the time of the survey, we enquired specifically about the role and application 
of this agreement.  We found that approximately one-third of firms followed this 
agreement in full, whilst a further one-third applied some elements.   
 
Given the timing of the survey, it is not particularly surprising that wage cuts were 
found to be extremely rare, applying to slightly over 2 per cent of firms.  Wage 
freezes were more common than cuts, but, at just over 7 per cent, still applied to a 
relatively small group of firms.  When we asked firms about reasons for avoiding 
wage cuts, Irish firms are the least likely to rank regulations and collective bargaining 
arrangements compared to the survey results for other countries.  This response is 
important when one considers the deterioration in economic conditions since the 
survey was undertaken.  It shows that Irish firms do not regard themselves as facing 
significant structural or institutional obstacles to wage reductions, even if at the time 
of the survey very few firms had experienced wage cuts in practice.     3
 
The paper also describes the role of flexible pay and bonuses in allowing firms to 
adjust total labour costs.  Our results show that almost half of all firms do not pay any 
performance-related bonuses. When bonuses are used, they were found, on average, 
to represent more than one-fifth of the wage bill of the firm. Of the strategies 
suggested for reducing labour costs, the one most commonly used by firms in the 
sample was to bring in new recruits at a more junior level when replacing workers 
who have left the firm. Cutting flexible wage components would be used by 13 per 
cent of firms.   
 
The choice of cost-reducing strategy varied with the composition of the workforce. 
Firms with a high percentage of production workers were the most likely to use 
changes in shifts, and firms with a higher percentage of temporary workers were more 
likely to use changes in promotions and retirements to reduce costs.  The payment of 
bonuses was positively related not just to the use of bonuses as potential cost reducing 
margin but to almost all of the alternative strategies.  This would appear to capture a 
general level of compensation flexibility in firms that have any sort of bonus 
structure.  For each of the strategies, the percentage of firms that had used them 
increased steadily with firm size.  Larger firms tend to have more complex pay 
structures than smaller firms and this gives them a greater element of flexibility when 
it comes to reducing costs using non-wage elements of compensation.    
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1.  Introduction 
International evidence shows that wages exhibit a considerable degree of downward 
rigidity. Cuts in base wages are extremely rare, even when high rates of 
unemployment might be expected to put downward pressure on wages.  In the current 
economic climate, the level of flexibility in both base wages and other components of 
compensation are receiving considerable attention as concerns about the 
competitiveness of the Irish economy mount.  This paper uses results from a specially 
commissioned survey of close to 1000 Irish firms in manufacturing, construction and 
services to examine how wages are determined.  The focus is on two key questions.  
First, what factors affect a firm’s participation in implementing the national wage 
agreement?  Second, how flexible are Irish wage levels? To address this issue we look 
not just at the possibility of reductions in nominal base wages, but also at pressure on 
real wages in terms of the passing on of cost of living increases and the prevalence of 
potentially more flexible elements of pay such as bonuses. 
 
The results are derived from a survey of wage setting carried out in late 2007 and 
early 2008 by the Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland 
(CBFSAI), as part of a co-ordinated research effort across the Euro system.  The 
survey was motivated by a general lack of information on wage and price adjustment 
at the level of the firm, and, in particular, the lack of information that could be 
compared across countries on a consistent basis. The survey questionnaire was 
designed by representatives of the participating national central banks and the 
European Central Bank (ECB), with the aid of external experts on labour markets and 
survey methodology. This paper presents the wage-setting results of the Irish survey, 
and includes comparisons of results with other participating countries on a number of 
key issues. One advantage of the survey is that it adds to our understanding of the 
forces driving firm level responses to wage changes such as those agreed under the 
national wage agreements.  
 
We find very few wage cuts and freezes reported by firms in the survey.  It is 
important to place this in the context of the relatively strong labour market while the 
survey fieldwork was undertaken.  The overall economic situation has deteriorated   5
significantly since this data was collected and there is emerging anecdotal evidence 
that nominal wages are being frozen or cut.  The Irish Business and Employers 
Confederation (IBEC 2009) reports that almost two-thirds of its members are 
considering implementing wage freezes over the following three months and pay cuts 
are expected by 20%.  Although these forward-looking rates are considerably higher 
than the actual wage cuts reported in our survey, they are in accord with our overall 
conclusion regarding the flexibility of the Irish labour market.  This is based on our 
findings that firms make extensive use of flexible elements of compensation that are 
easier to adjust in the face of negative shocks than base pay and also because 
institutional impediments to wage adjustment were not regarded as particularly 
relevant by the responding firms.       
 
The structure of this paper is as follows; Section 2 provides some further background 
on the survey and on the formulation of the questionnaire sent to the surveyed firms.  
Section 3 presents the results from questions on the extent of collective bargaining 
arrangements and how inflation is factored into wage negotiations.  Section 4 presents 
evidence on the frequency of wage cuts and freezes, and reasons firms rarely use such 
methods even when seeking cost reductions.  Section 5 covers more flexible elements 
of pay, such as bonuses, and how these can be used as alternatives to reducing wages. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Survey Design 
2.1  Questionnaire Content and Approach 
The survey was undertaken as part of a coordinated network made up of central banks 
from across Europe.  The Survey Unit of the Economic and Social Research Institute 
(ESRI) was commissioned to conduct the fieldwork for the survey in Ireland. The 
final questionnaire was sent out in late September 2007.  The survey was a mixed 
modal survey; postal distribution of the questionnaire was followed by five rounds of 
intensive phone interviewer follow-up. From such a survey methodology, the final 
response was extremely satisfactory at 23 per cent. The stratified sampling strategy 
was based on an equal probability basis, stratified by employment size category, 
sector (NACE code) and region.  The final questionnaire comprised of four sections 
with 34 questions and is included as Appendix C.  This paper uses information from 
three of these sections, which are described in more detail below.   6
 
Section 1 gathers information about the firm including general firm descriptives 
including age and size; the composition of the workforce; the labour turnover rate 
during 2006; the tenure and occupational distribution and the importance of labour 
costs.  Section 2 contained questions on wage-setting practices and the role of any 
wage-bargaining processes. As Towards 2016 was the National Wage Agreement in 
place at the time of the survey, we enquired specifically about the role and application 
of this agreement. Other questions included the proportion of the 2006 wage bill that 
was variable and whether bonuses were applied. Also relevant for wage setting is the 
role of wage indexation to inflation and tenure related changes and how the entry 
wage for newly hired employees were set.  The section concluded with a question 
examining the frequency and timing of wage changes. 
 
Section 3 of the questionnaire examined the existence of downward wage rigidity and 
its causes. The questions were based on similar research in the United States (Blinder 
and Choi, 1990; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997), Sweden (Agell and Bennmarker, 
2002) and Germany (Franz and Pfeiffer, 2006). The history of wage freezes and cuts 
was taken as well as firms being asked to rank the relevance of a list of hypothetical 
reasons why base wages would not typically be cut in the case of a requirement to cut 
labour costs.  Other strategies to reduce labour costs were also outlined and 
respondents indicated options that might apply to their firm.  
 
Questions were mostly concentrated on base wages i.e. fixed pay excluding bonuses 
but including commission and piecework payments. The main occupational category 
was defined according to the largest share of workers at the firm and broadly 
represented the skill content of the job undertaken therein. This classification was 




2.2  Description of the Sample 
The sample was derived by the ESRI from the ‘Kompass’ database of Irish firms. The 
sample was composed in such a way that firms of all sizes would be represented 
according to their distribution nationally. Firms in distribution and other service   7
sectors were heavily represented in terms of the number of employees covered. The 
average number of employees per firm in our sample was 23.  
 
Table 1: Size and Sector classification of firms in our sample 
No. of firms  Manufacturing  Construction Distribution Oth.  Services All 
Micro 5-9  25  12  77  108  222
Small 10-49  74  43  131  220  468
Medium 50-249  55  20  53  66  194
Large 250+  43  5  15  38  101
Total 197  80  276  432  985
 
To make the survey results representative of the total population of firms, a weighting 
scheme was specifically derived. Individual firm weights were deemed necessary 
where an over- or under-representation of the national population of firms were 
observed in the sample aggregates. The chosen weighting scheme is based on 
employment and is calculated by taking the total workforce of the firm subgroup and 
dividing it by the number of firms in question. For a given firm, the individual weight 
assigned to it indicates the number of workers in the total population, taking account 
of the sector to which it belongs.  
 
3.  Collective Bargaining and the National Wage Agreement 
The issue of downward rigidities in wages is at the centre of traditional Keynesian 
models (Stiglitz, 1999).   Wage rigidities arise when firms are slow to adjust wages in 
response to labour market conditions.  For example, even in the presence of high 
unemployment, firms may be slow to reduce nominal wage levels.  In Ireland’s case, 
the national wage agreements provided a macroeconomic structure to achieve 
aggregate wage restraint (but not a reduction in wage costs) in the face of pressures 
from inflation and historically high unemployment. A stated aim of Irish wage 
agreements was that pay moderation could be achieved through social partner co-
operation and in exchange for income tax cuts.  
 
The standard analytical tool used to examine the existence of downward wage rigidity 
is survey analysis.  Notable examples included Blinder (1990), Agell and Lundborg   8
(2003), Campbell and Kamlani (1997) and Franz and Pfeiffer (2006). All of these 
studies have focussed on the relevance of institutional and theoretical explanations for 
wage rigidity.  Questions on wage setting in firms were directed mainly at enquiring 
about the formal process of wage negotiations operated by the firm and, in particular, 
the role played by the wage terms of the National Wage Agreement. The institutional 
setting of wage bargaining in Ireland is less structured than in many other European 
countries; for example, Ireland has one of the lowest shares of collective bargaining.   
 
National wage agreements were instigated in Ireland in 1987.  They were introduced 
after a prolonged period of poor economic growth, coupled with high unemployment 
and significant industrial relations disharmony.  The key element of the process was 
an agreement for moderate growth in pre-tax wages in return for reductions in labour 
income taxes on the part of the government.  Lane (1998) makes the case that “[t]his 
process is self-reinforcing: since workers ultimately care about their post-tax wage 
rate, a cut in labour taxes relieves the burden on union leaders to press for larger 
pretax wage increases from employers.”  The relevance and importance of Irish 
national pay agreements (negotiated through a process known as Social Partnership) 
have been identified in a number of previous studies (Sexton and O’Connell, 1996; 
Lane, 1998; Sweeney, 1998, O’Donnell, 1999, Hardiman, 2000; Teague and 
Donaghey, 2004; Baccaro and Simoni, 2007; O’Donnell, 2008). Most of this research 
points to the achievement of wage constraint and its competitiveness-enhancing effect 
for firms operating in Ireland.  
 
The survey results from our sample of Irish firms’ wage setting allows us to profile 
the role, coverage and frequency of negotiated wage agreements.  Our survey results 
in Table 2 show that the practice of wage negotiation is well established within Irish 
firms: 62 per cent of firms surveyed apply at least some aspects of the then current 
national wage agreement – Towards 2016.
2 
 
                                                 
2 Since centralised wage bargaining was reintroduced in 1987 through a process known as Social 
Partnership, there have been nine agreements to date; the most recent was agreed in October-
November 2008 after the period of fieldwork for our survey.    9
Table 2:  Application of the National Wage Agreement – Towards 2016 
  % of respondents 
Towards 2016 applied in full  35.6 
Some aspects applied  26.0 
Towards 2016 not applied  38.4 
All firms  100.0 
 
Our survey found that when wage agreements were made, they appear to have been 
applied very extensively throughout Irish firms. Half of firms with agreements apply 
them to their entire workforce while the average value for workforce coverage is 86 
per cent. This corresponds with an average coverage rate of just below 90 per cent 
found by McGuinness et al (2008) for all levels of wage bargaining in Ireland. Where 
there is less than a ‘blanket application’ of the agreement, the skill group of 
technically-qualified workers and supervisory staff are the most likely group 
collectively to be the exception, as their average workforce application rate is lower 
than the overall average. In the tight labour market conditions prevailing up to the 
time of the survey, this group may have been the hardest to recruit and retain and this 
may be reflected in a wage premium over and above the wage increases collectively 
agreed. 
 
We now conduct a multivariate analysis to examine the factors associated with firms 
applying the terms of the National Wage Agreement (NWA).  The regression analysis 
is formulated as a multinomial probit model where firms have three options – apply 
the NWA in full (reference category), apply the NWA partially or not at all.  With 
respect to firm size, the results in Table 3 suggest that larger firms are more likely to 
apply the NWA in full compared to micro sized firms. The differences across sectors 
are not significant when other characteristics are controlled for.  
 
 
   10
Table 3: Multinomial probit regression of participating in National Wage 
Agreement Towards 2016 
  Not Applied Some Aspects 
Applied 
 
























































Export share  0.005
(0.003)
*0 . 0 0 1  
(0.003) 
 















    
Observations 791
Multinomial probit with reference category of National Wage Agreement applied in full 
Robust Std. Error in parentheses  
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The regression results also show that firms are more likely to employ the NWA when 
they are longer established, and have a higher share of their workforce employed part-
time. As discussed above, the greater the share of highly-skilled employees the more 
likely that terms of the NWA are not applied.  As before, business cycle 
considerations are not significant in determining the profile of firms who apply the 
NWA wage terms as the firm position vis-à-vis turnover does not appear significant in 
either model shown in 3.  Having examined the coverage of firms’ participating in 
national wage agreements, we now examine the extent of wage rigidity amongst Irish 
firms.  
 
4. Wage  Rigidity 
This section examines the frequency of wage cuts and presents evidence on why firms 
exhibit resistance to cuts when economic theory would dictate that a reduction in the 
price of labour would be desirable.  The first three subsections focus on the possibility 
of reductions in nominal wages.  The final subsection presents evidence on the 
indexation policy of firms, to examine if real wages show similar levels of rigidity as 
nominal wages. 
 
4.1 How common are wage cuts? 
We asked firms if they had cut or frozen base wages over the previous five years, and, 
if they had, what percentage of the workforce this applied to (Table 4).  Given that 
this question covers a period of sustained economic growth, it is not particularly 
surprising that wage cuts are extremely rare, applying to slightly over one per cent of 
firms.  These firms were mainly very small – firms with between 5 and 9 employees 
were the most likely to have cut wages with no medium sized firms (50 to 249 
employees) and less than one per cent of larger firms (over 250 employees) reporting 
wage cuts.   
 
Most of the firms that did cut wages were in manufacturing.  No wage cuts occurred 
in the construction sector and very few were reported in trade and distribution.  The 
services sector experienced wage cuts in 2.5 per cent of firms.  Wage freezes were 
more common than cuts, but, at just over 7 per cent, still applied to a relatively small   12
group of firms.  Unlike wage cuts, wage freezes were not concentrated in any one 
sector or size group, although they were more common in manufacturing than in other 
firms.  If a wage freeze was implemented, it was applied to the entire workforce in 
two-thirds of cases.   
 
Table 4: Incidence of Wage Cuts and Freezes 
Percentage of Firms  Wage Cuts  Wage Freezes 
Overall   1.1  7.1 
Size category  Micro, 5-9  2.7  7.0 
 Small,  10-49  0.9  6.1 
 Medium,  50-249  0.0  10.2 
 Large,  250+  0.7  7.3 
Sector Manufacturing  4.1  10.6 
 Construction  0.0  5.2 
 Trade  /  Distribution  1.0  5.8 
 Other  services  2.5  7.3 
 
 
There is a positive relationship between wage cuts and firms reporting turnover lower 
than in the previous year, although this finding is not significant in a statistical sense 
if controls for firm size and sector are included.  As so few firms report wage cuts, it 
is difficult to establish robust statistical relationships with other variables.  More firms 
report having frozen wages at some point and this larger sample size allows for more 
reliable analysis of contributing factors.  Controlling for sector and size effects, we 
find that firms experiencing lower turnover than the previous year are 10 per cent 
more likely to have frozen wages than firms with the same or higher turnover.  Firms 
describing turnover as “much lower” were 12 per cent more likely to freeze wages 
than those with turnover the same or higher than the previous period.   
 
Ireland’s percentage of firms reporting wage cuts is amongst the lowest of the 
countries in the sample, and is well below the average value of 2.8 per cent (Table 5). 
The southern European countries of Italy, Spain and Portugal are the least likely to cut 
wages, and the highest value is just over 7 per cent for France. The variation across   13
countries in the incidence of wage freezes is considerably larger than for wage cuts, 
ranging from 2.4 per cent in Spain to over 20 per cent in the Czech Republic, Estonia 
and the Netherlands.  The average percentage of firms to have frozen wages across all 
the countries is 11.3 per cent.  The incidences of wage cuts and freezes in Ireland are 
significantly lower than the European average. 
 
Table 5: International Comparison of Wage Cuts and Freezes 
Percentage of Firms  Wage Cuts  Wage Freezes 
Ireland 1.1  7.1 
Austria 2.1  13.3 
Belgium 2.8  11.9 
Czech Republic  6.7  26.6 
Estonia 3.1  21.7 
Spain 0.1  2.4 
France 7.1  2.5 
Hungary 2.6  5.9 
Italy 0.7  3.9 
Netherlands 1.4  23.2 
Poland 4.4  10.0 
Portugal 1.0  14.9 
Slovenia 2.5  2.9 
All country average  2.8  11.3 
 
The next step is to examine if there are any particular characteristics of firms that 
experienced a wage freeze. Although it would be desirable to do the same for wage 
cuts, the very small number of observations made this impossible.  Table 6 presents 
the results for probit regressions where the dependent variable took a value of 1 if 
wages had ever been frozen by the firm and 0 otherwise.  In both specifications, a 
higher percentage of temporary staff is likely to experience of a wage freeze.  Firms 
with larger proportions of technical workers are the least likely to have frozen wages 
over the same time period.  No significant effect is found for other types of worker or 
nature of contract.  Labour turnover is negatively associated on a significant basis 
with wage freezes.  Although the direction of causation cannot be established with   14
any certainty, it seems plausible that firms with high labour turnover are reluctant to 
freeze wages and thus reduce their ability to attract new workers.   
Table 6: Wage Freezes and Firm Characteristics 
 (I)    (II) 
% Part-time  -0.0001  -0.0001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Temporary  0.002**  0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Technical  -0.001**  -0.001** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Clerical  -0.0003  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
% Professional  -0.0002  -0.0003 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Labour turnover  -0.002***  -0.002*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001) 
Labour cost share  0.001*  0.001** 
 (0.001)  (0.0005) 
Full Nat. Wage Agr.    -0.06** 
   (0.02) 
Partial Nat. Wage Agr.    0.004 
   (0.03) 
Small, 10-49  -0.01  -0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.03) 
Medium, 50-249  0.02  0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.03) 
Large, 250+  0.02  0.04 
 (0.04)  (0.04) 
Observations 525  514 
Pseudo R-sqd  0.09  0.13 
Probit regression marginal effects reported.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Sector 
controls included.  *** Indicates significance at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10%. 
 
The second column of Table 6 adds participation in the national wage agreement and 
finds that implementing the agreement in full is negatively associated with wage 
freezes – as the national wage agreement included positive wage growth, this is   15
unsurprising.   Partial application of the national wage agreement does not have any 
significant impact, implying that firms that did not implement the agreement in full 
had freedom to opt out of the wage increase clauses in at least some incidences. 
 
4.2 Firms’ reasons for avoiding cuts - theory 
Many explanations for the lack of downward flexibility in wages have been put 
forward over time.  Campbell and Kamlani (1997) group the various theories into five 
broad groups and their classification has partly motivated the questions put to the 
firms in the survey.  The first potential source of downward rigidity in the labour 
market is the existence of explicit contracts either with the workers themselves that 
are negotiated for multiple years or if wage cuts are impeded by labour regulations or 
collective agreements.  A second source of rigidity may be the existence of implicit 
contracts between the firm and workers.  The implicit contracts framework assumes 
that workers are more risk averse than firms and the two groups will therefore 
negotiate a type of insurance arrangement whereby the workers’ real wages will be 
kept relatively stable even if the firm experiences variations in its fortunes.  The firm 
gains if this stable wage can be kept below what the average wage would be over the 
business cycle and the worker benefits by not having to deal with unpredictable 
changes in income. 
 
The third set of explanations for downward wage rigidity can be found in the 
efficiency wage literature, which presents a number of behavioural explanations for 
firms to avoid cutting wages.  These models are based on the assumption that wages 
directly influence worker productivity. Reducing the wage would therefore have a 
negative impact on employees’ efforts, resulting in less output for the firm.  A wage 
reduction could also affect morale within the firm, which could manifest itself in 
reduced effort or more extremely risk conflict between owners and workers.  Further 
explanations within the efficiency wage literature relate to how the firm’s actions in 
cutting wages could impact on its staff composition and future recruitment 
opportunities. A reduction in wages could give existing staff an incentive to leave the 
firm.  These are likely to be the most productive workers who would have the best 
outside options.  This would imply the firm might have to increase expenditure on 
recruitment but its reputation as an employer could be damaged, making it difficult to   16
attract high quality staff.  This could have a knock-on effect on the costs of training.  
 
This latter explanation has also been framed in a different way as a fourth source of 
wage rigidity known as the insider-outsider theory.  In this theory, it is not in the 
firm’s interest to fire existing workers in order to hire others at a lower wage.  This is 
partly due to the associated costs of recruitment and training as in the efficiency wage 
theory.  However, this theory adds a further dimension by suggesting that retained 
original workers in this scenario would withhold their cooperation from the new 
recruits and hold up the production process.  The final explanation for wage rigidity is 
that employees are concerned with how their wage compares to that of similar 
workers in other firms in the same market and that their effort levels will be based on 
a comparison with what they believe to be a ‘fair wage’ for their job level. 
 
Surveys of firms aimed at understanding how these theories fit with actual behaviour 
have been carried out in the US (Bewley, 1999; Blinder and Choi, 1990; Campbell 
and Kamlani, 1997), in Sweden  (Agell and Lundborg, 1995, 2003) and in Germany 
(Franz and Pfeiffer, 2006).  Fairness and morale considerations come up in all of these 
studies as reasons to avoid wage cuts if at all possible.  Campbell and Kamlani find 
that the most relevant explanations may vary by worker type: They found that 
reducing turnover was a factor for white-collar workers and that firms believed that 
blue-collar workers were more likely to reduce effort if wages fell.  Unions and 
collective bargaining arrangements were found to exert a significant influence on the 
prevention of wage cuts in Germany (Franz and Pfeiffer, 2006) and Sweden (Agell 
and Lundborg, 2003) but do not appear to be a significant factor in the US (unions are 
not mentioned in any of the papers using US survey evidence).   
 
4.3 Firms’ reasons for avoiding cuts – survey responses 
Having reviewed some of the theoretical rationales explaining why firms avoid wage 
cuts as far as possible, we now look at how relevant the firms in the sample regarded 
these reasons to their own experiences.  The firms were asked: “There can be various 
reasons as to why base wages are not, or only very slightly cut, even if your firm 
needs to reduce labour costs.  Please indicate their relevance in your company.”  The   17
following list of reasons was provided:  
•  Impeded by labour regulation/ collective agreements.  
•  Negative impact on employees’ efforts, resulting in less output. 
•  Negative impact on employees’ morale. 
•  Negative impact on the firm’s reputation as an employer. 
•  Best employees would leave the firm. 
•  Increase costs of hiring and training new employees.  
•  Difficulties in attracting new workers. 
•  Workers dislike unpredictable reductions in income (implicit contract). 
•  Employees compare wages to similar workers in other firms.  
 
Table 7:  International Comparison of Reasons for Avoiding Wage Cuts 
Percentage of Firms indicating “Relevant” or “Very Relevant” 







Ireland 22.9  79.8  76.1  61.0  79.1  56.1  64.6  78.8  75.7 
Austria 77.0  89.8  87.3  64.4  84.6  77.2  47.8  41.8  67.5 
Belgium 84.0  87.6  88.1  55.9  81.1  65.7  72.6  81.4  67.7 
Czech R.  56.0  85.8  82.7  69.0  94.7  87.2  82.1  46.4  77.7 
Estonia 53.6  89.9  89.6  83.5  94.2  91.0  87.1  53.6  80.1 
Spain 91.2  72.0  NA  43.3  69.5  54.1  59.6  71.4  50.3 
France 78.2  90.9  90.4  51.3  79.0  37.6  68.8  22.1  47.1 
Hungary 43.1  80.3  81.7  55.9  71.0  47.8  45.7  79.6  74.1 
Italy 87.8  85.2  NA  58.2  89.6  86.2  71.1  29.3  70.4 
Netherlands 63.5  78.2  NA  64.1 76.6  61.7  78.6  77.5  69.3 
Poland 34.1    71.5  91.6  60.6  89.2  67.1  76.1  71.6  53.9 
Portugal 76.9  84.0  85.3  56.6  82.9  53.8  54.6  81.9  64.2 
Slovenia 69.9  87.1  84.8  75.6  89.1  72.2  77.3  77.0  77.1 
Average 64.5  83.2  85.8  61.5  83.1  66.0  68.2  62.5  67.3 
  
Firms were asked to rank each one of these explanations on a four-point scale of 
relevance.  Combining the relevant and very relevant categories in Table 7, labour 
regulations and collective agreements are regarded as the least relevant of the barriers,   18
while concerns about reductions in employee effort and losing talent are the most 
relevant reasons.  There was some variation in these rankings by firm size, mainly in 
regard to the perceived relevance of collective bargaining and regulations.  Over 45 
per cent of the largest firms regarded regulations and bargaining arrangements as 
relevant compared to just 20 per cent of the smallest firms.  In general, larger firms 
were more likely to regard all of the explanations for avoiding wage cuts as relevant 
or very relevant.  This is consistent with the earlier result that small firms were more 
likely to cut wages if necessary.    
 
Comparing the responses of Irish firms to those in other European countries in Table 
7, we found common concerns about effort, morale and risk of losing good 
employees.  Irish firms are the least likely to rank regulations and collective 
bargaining arrangements as an important reasons for avoiding wage cuts.  This 
response is important when one considers the deterioration in economic conditions 
since the survey was undertaken.  It shows that Irish firms do not regard themselves as 
facing significant structural or institutional obstacles to wage reductions, even if at the 
time of the survey very few firms had experienced wage cuts in practice.  Exposure to 
future higher hiring costs or difficulties in recruitment are also less likely to be 
regarded as relevant by Irish firms compared to those in other countries.  On the other 
hand, awareness of employees comparing their wages to others and an expectation on 
the part of the workers that wages should be kept smooth (allowing profits to vary 
instead) were ranked more highly by Irish firms than the average across the other 
surveyed countries. 
 
4.4  Wage Changes and Indexation Policy 
The indexation mechanism plays a fixed role in many countries. In the Irish case, 
there is no national indexation policy and our survey includes a question to the extent 
to which firm-level negotiations took into account (or had automatic) past or expected 
inflation.  Well-informed workers typically care about real inflation-adjusted earnings 
and not just nominal earnings. International experience shows that employees will 
become more concerned about wages relative to other workers and relative to the cost 
of living in times when inflation puts pressure on nominal wages. From a 
microeconomic perspective and from the point of view of implied contracts theory,   19
two factors typically lead to demands for wage indexation: the simultaneous existence 
of inflation and wage negotiation costs and a greater risk aversion among the workers 
than among the employers. The existence of wage renegotiation costs makes 
lengthening the duration of contracts desirable. Wage negotiations imply costs to the 
participants, as a degree of rigidity in nominal wages is inevitable when contracts fix 
the nominal wage for a set period of time. It is often assumed that the wage agreement 
corresponds to the equilibrium at the moment of negotiation.  
 
The literature on the optimal degree of wage indexation tries to determine the 
advantages – in terms of output stability – of nominal wages versus fixed wage 
agreement. In the presence of inflation, the real wage will be eroded over the life of 
the contract, such that the effective real wage will be above the equilibrium value at 
the beginning of the contract and below the equilibrium towards the end. A wage 
adjustment rule typically ties the growth rate of nominal wages to the movement of an 
index representing the price trend. The chosen index is usually one that is publicly 
available such as the consumer price index. It then becomes possible to extend the 
period between negotiations but depends on the level and variance of inflation to 
determine the optimal level of indexation.  
 
When wages are perfectly indexed, the real wage remains fixed and rigid from 
downward revision. Whilst no binding indexation rule has ever been introduced as 
part of the Irish sequence of national agreements, wage increases have generally 
tended to be influenced by the prevailing rate of inflation. There is always a lower 
propensity to have indexation to expected inflation as a formal rule than recorded past 
inflation. The survey found that 71 per cent of Irish firms do not have a policy of 
automatically adapting base wage rates to inflation. Of those that do index wages to 
inflation with a formal rule i.e. an automatic link, Table 8 shows that it is likely to be 
the past inflation rate that is used in one in five cases of indexation (19.3 per cent). 
However, wage changes are much more likely to take account of the general cost of 
living changes without a formal or automatic rule.
3  
                                                 
3 Wage indexation as stipulated in contracts would be perfect if all actors had the same expectations 
regarding inflation and if precise, day-to-day information on the movement of the general price level   20
 
Table 8: Share of all firms who adapt base wages to inflation        
Row Percentage   28.6% 
  
Of which:   
Wage changes automatically linked to past inflation 19.3% 
Wage changes automatically linked to expected inflation 8.0% 
Past inflation taken into account 60.5% 
Expected inflation taken into account 32.7% 
 
Given the relative stability of inflation in the euro area context, it is not surprising that 
our survey found a two-to-one split in favour of past inflation over expected inflation 
where a less-strict indexation policy is applied (i.e. not an automatic adjustment but 
inflation ‘taken into account’). This is quite rational in a stable inflation environment, 
such that many estimates of expected inflation will assume a continuation of the 
recently recorded inflation trend to persist into the future. The finding that indexation 
adjustments are most likely to occur only once a year also demonstrates that the 
variability of inflation has not been a problem for wage setting in Ireland. 
 
The second microeconomic justification for wage indexation is related to the problem 
of the distribution of risk. If firms/employers are better able than workers to reduce 
risk (and are not as risk averse), then optimal contracts will settle on stable real wages 
in exchange for a reduction in the level of wages i.e. risk adverse employees take a 
risk premium in return for stability to get an implicit insurance against unexpected 
variation in the inflation rate.
4 Wage indexation thus serves to increase the rate of real 
wage downward rigidity. It would take practically zero inflation before a scenario of 
wage cuts could be considered a realistic possibility – in times of cost of living 
pressures, a pay freeze would only then be sufficient to cut real wage costs but 
                                                                                                                                            
were available. This accounts for why some negotiated contracts have tended to use a mixture of past 
and expected inflation considerations, and explains why the sum of the row percentages in Table 
exceeds 100 per cent.  
 
4 The theoretical underpinnings here is the implicit contract model which states that workers are risk-
averse and prefer a stable wage to one that varies over the business cycle so a firm offering a stable 
wage could on average pay a lower wage than firm that always paid a wage equal to the workers’ 
marginal revenue product.  Therefore firms and workers reach an implicit understanding that wages 
will remain stable even though worker productivity rates may vary (Campbell and Kamlani, 1997).   21
indexation prevents this correction mechanism being used to bring the labour market 
closer to equilibrium in times of unemployment.   
Table 9: Factors affecting firm policy of indexing wages to inflation 
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Observations 829 




The results from a regression analysis of factors potentially affecting a firm’s policy 
of indexing wages to inflation are shown in Table 9. No particular indexation policy 
pattern emerged across firm size, age and sector categories. As discussed above, a 
higher share of high skilled and/or management staff is found to be associated with a 
policy of wage indexation – the higher the share in the staff complement, the more 
likely that this policy is a formal one related to either past or expected price inflation, 
having controlled for instances where there is a specific firm-level wage negotiation 
process.  Firms paying bonuses relating to individual staff performance are associated 
with higher levels of wage increases linked to inflation while business performance 
(higher turnover than previous year) as a proxy for ability to pay by the firm also 
appears as a significant variable.   
 
 
5.  Flexible Pay Components 
This section deals with remuneration principles and in particular the role of flexible 
pay and bonuses.   The first subsection describes the extent to which bonuses are used 
by Irish firms.  The second subsection looks at how commonly flexible components of 
pay are used by firms to reduce costs, while avoiding reductions in base pay.  The 
final subsection looks at whether negotiation of wages with newly hired workers is 
more flexible than the wage levels of incumbent employees.   
 
Babecky et al. (2009) find that flexible components of pay are fairly commonly used 
strategies across Europe to reduce labour costs in ways other than reducing base 
wages.  The method by which this is done is related to several firm characteristics 
such as the relative size or skills distribution as well as several indicators of the 
economic environment in which they operate. In particular, larger firms show greater 
margin of manoeuvre with respect to using flexible pay strategies in order to adjust 
labour costs. Different indicators of the severity of competition suggest that firms in 
more competitive environments are more likely to use some of these strategies more 
heavily. Furthermore, we find that the presence of unions in wage setting is associated   23
with a greater use of most of the strategies. A plausible explanation is that unions 
limit the flexibility of wages, pushing firms towards alternative labour cost cutting 
strategies.  
 
The analysis in this section focuses on the adjustment of wages or labour costs 
without changing the level of employment.  There is of course a quantity margin 
available to the firm to reduce costs.  In response to a hypothetical question on how 
they would react to a slowdown in demand, 15 percent of firms replied that they 
would reduce the number of regular employees and a further 15 percent would lay off 
some temporary workers.  Reducing hours instead of employment would be chosen 
by slightly more than 10 percent of firms.  Changes in flexible components of pay, 
which we will consider in detail in this section, were the option chosen by 8 percent 
of firms.  A negligible amount suggested that they would respond by cutting base 
wages with the remainder of firms indicating they would reduce other costs before 
cutting the wage bill.      
 
5.1 Bonuses 
A centralised or coordinated wage bargaining system may cause low wage 
differentiation/low wage inequality and high unemployment differentials across skill 
groups, population groups and industries. Under such a system, wages across all 
groups converge to the ‘firm-level standard’ appropriate for the high productivity 
group or will, most likely, be determined by the most populous medium group. The 
question arises whether an additional layer of firm-level negotiations overcomes this 
wage rigidity effect by discriminately adjusting flexible wage components (bonuses, 
etc.).  Firms might use flexible compensation to increase wage flexibility in the 
presence of rigid base wage structures.  
 
The fixed costs associated with hiring and firing (turnover costs) help explain why 
flexible wage components (especially overtime, bonuses) typically precede increases 
in employment. The higher are turnover costs, the greater the incentive of firms to 
respond to cyclical fluctuations through capital-labour substitution and flexible wage 
components rather than through hiring and firing. In the aftermath of booms,   24
employment will tend to remain relatively high when firms engage in labour hoarding 
and are reticent to shed employment; especially if the business cycle downturn is 
likely to be short and shallow. Layoffs typically lag downturns when their 
permanence becomes established. Consequently, swings in productivity will be more 
procyclical and will exacerbate high unemployment persistence after a recession 
(Lindbeck and Snower, 2001).
5 
 
Our survey collected information on the availability and use of flexible wage 
components. First, base wages were defined as wages and salaries including 
commission and piecework payments but excluding bonuses. Firms indicated the 
percentage of their total wage bill in 2006 that was variable, that is, paid in the form 
of bonuses over and above base wages based on individual or company performance. 
This is our variable measuring the use of ‘flexible pay structures’. Our aim was to test 
the extent to which firms were applying more complex pay schemes, where rigidity in 
base wages is circumvented with other flexible pay elements (e.g. bonuses and 
flexible benefits).  
 
























1.40 2.06  1.73  4.78  3.23 
 
The results in Table 10 show that almost half of all firms (46 per cent) did not pay any 
performance-related bonuses. Where bonuses were paid, the average individual 
performance-related bonus in 2006 was 7.5 per cent of a firm’s total wage bill, while 
                                                 
5According to the literature known as efficiency-wage theory, firms may agree to pay wage premiums 
to avoid certain costs including shirking, labour turnover, industrial conflict for existing employees and 
for new hires use wages as a screening device for productivity with the hope of extracting the most 
efficient amount of effort for an agreed wage (which may be overpriced).   25
company performance-related bonuses were 3.2 per cent of the total wage bill on 
average.
6  In the top quarter of firms with the largest share of bonuses in pay, flexible 
wage components were found to represent more than 42.5 per cent of the firm’s total  
wage bill. As expected, highly-qualified employees and management (high skill, 
white collar group) are most likely to receive a bonus element to their remuneration 
with low skill workers less likely to be rewarded for individual performance or 
receive a share in overall company performance (e.g. profit-sharing). Table 10 shows 
that highly qualified staff also receive the highest bonuses obtaining 7.4 per cent of 
the total wage bill on average in individual performance bonuses and 4.8 per cent of 
the total wage bill in company-related performance bonuses when payable.  
 
5.2 Non-Wage Cost Reduction Strategies 
Flexible wage components give firms additional methods of adjustment if they need 
to reduce costs but cannot reduce base wages.  We identify the following main 
strategies to cut labour costs (other than wages) and ask the firms if they have used 
them: 
•  Reduce or eliminate bonus payments. 
•  Reduce or eliminate non-pay benefits. 
•  Change shift assignments or additional payments for working shifts. 
•  Slow or freeze rate at which promotions are filled. 
•  Recruit new employees at lower wage level than those who left voluntarily. 
•  Encourage early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with 
lower wages. 
Table 11: Alternative Labour Cost Reductions 
%  All Firms  5-19 Emp.  20-49 Emp.  50-249 Emp.  250+ Emp. 
Reduce bonuses  13.3  12.0  14.7  18.8  19.7 
Reduce benefits  4.9  3.8  5.7  10.3  10.4 
Change shifts  9.8  6.9  12.3  24.1  22.4 
                                                 
6 However, there is a high variance in the distribution of this variable (mean is 11.6 per cent but the 
standard deviation is 24.6 per cent).     26
Slow promotions  4.7  3.4  5.5  11.5  11.3 
Cheaper hires  27.5  22.7  35.4  42.8  45.6 
Early retirement  3.9  2.4  5.3  9.6  17.5 
 
As we can see from Table 11, the most commonly used strategy was to bring in new 
recruits at a more junior level than employees who had left the firm; this was used by 
over 27 per cent of firms.  Reductions in bonuses were the next most commonly used 
strategy, reported by 13.3 per cent of all firms. If we restrict ourselves to look only at 
firms that currently pay bonuses, 21 per cent report reducing these bonuses in order to 
lower costs.  This was followed by changes in shift patterns or premiums associated 
with shift-work.   
 
The pattern of strategies used by firms to reduce labour costs without cutting wages 
varies quite considerably across countries.  In Table 12, we compare the Irish results 
to other European firms.   
 
Table 12:  International Comparison of Labour Cost Reduction Strategies 













Ireland 13.3  4.9  9.8 4.7 27.5  3.9 
Belgium 18.4  7.9 7.2  15.0  26.4 18.9 
Czech R.  32.2  7.5  11.1  1.9  8.7  8.9 
Estonia 40.2  20.5  21.1 6.2 16.2 2.6 
France 14.7  6.1  0.0  15.4  39.0  30.3 
Hungary 22.7  11.9  38.3  35.1  26.5 10.2 
Italy 25.6  21.8  26.0  34.0  45.6  20.2 
Poland 22.8  15.2  11.9  12.3  22.1  9.5 
Portugal 13.7  8.4  10.7 14.0  16.2  0.0 
Slovenia 13.5  12.8  9.2  18.9  15.8  8.9 
Average 21.7  11.7  14.5 15.7  24.4 11.3 
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Irish firms report lower than average usage of all but one of the strategies; replacing 
workers who leave the firm voluntarily with workers on a lower wage has been used 
by 27.5 per cent of Irish firms, some 3 per cent more than in other countries.  Firms in 
other countries are almost twice as likely (on average) to reduce bonuses and benefits 
compared to Irish firms, and were three times more likely to use promotions and 
retirement to reduce costs.   
Table 13: Use of Alternative Margins of Labour Cost Reduction 
 Bonus  Benefits  Shifts  Promotions  New  Emp  Retire 
% Part-time  -0.0004  0.0001  0.01*  -0.0002  0.0003  -0.0003 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0004) 
% Temporary  0.002  -0.0004  -0.0003  0.002***  0.002  0.001** 
 (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.0006) 
% Technical  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001  0.0004  -0.0004  -0.001** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0004) 
% Clerical  0.001  -0.0004  -0.004***  0.001  -0.001  0.0002 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0004) 
% Professional  0.001  -0.0003  -0.001*  0.0004  0.002  0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.0007)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0003) 
Bonus dummy  0.12***  0.05***  0.01  0.04*  0.10**  0.05*** 
 (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.02) 
Labour turnover  -0.0001  0.001*  -0.0003  -0.0003  -0.001  -0.001** 
 (0.001)  (0.0005)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0004) 
Labour cost share  -0.0003  0.001*  0.001  -0.000  0.002  -0.001 
 (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0003) 
Full Nat. Wage Agr.  -0.07**  0.05*  0.07*  0.03  -0.003  0.10*** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.04)  (0.02)  (0.05)  (0.03) 
Partial Nat. Wage Agr.  -0.01  0.04  0.10**  -0.01  -0.01  0.014 
 (0.04)  (0.04)  (0.05)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.03) 
Small, 10-49  -0.02  -0.01  0.13**  0.04  0.25***  0.07** 
 (0.04)  (0.03)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.04) 
Medium, 50-249  0.07  0.07**  0.17***  0.065*  0.33***  0.04 
 (0.05)  (0.04)  (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.03) 
Large, 250+  0.07  0.05  0.12**  0.073*  0.32***  0.09** 
 (0.06)  (0.04)  (0.07)  (0.05)  (0.08)  (0.06) 
Observations 508  508  508  508  508  508 
Pseudo R-sqd  0.10  0.13  0.14  0.12  0.09  0.28   28
Probit regression marginal effects reported.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Sector controls included.  *** Indicates 




Consistent with the findings of Babecky et al. (2009), the choice of strategy varies 
with the composition of the workforce. Firms with a high percentage of production 
workers were the most likely to use changes in shifts, and firms with a higher 
percentage of temporary workers were more likely to use changes in promotions and 
retirements to reduce costs.  The payment of bonuses was positively related not just to 
the use of bonuses as potential cost reducing margin but to almost all of the 
alternative strategies.  This would appear to capture a general level of compensation 
flexibility in firms that have any sort of bonus structure.  For each of the strategies, 
the percentage of firms that had used them increased steadily with firm size.  Larger 
firms tend to have more complex pay structures than smaller firms and this gives them 
a greater element of flexibility when it comes to using non-wage elements of 
compensation to reduce costs.    
 
5.3  Are New Hires a Source of Flexibility? 
The previous subsection showed that labour turnover could be used as a method of 
reducing the total labour cost bill if new employees were recruited at a lower wage 
level than those who left the firm.  There are two ways that this could work: New 
employees could start at a lower point in the firm pay scale, particularly if they are 
less experienced than the worker who left or retired.  Alternatively, wages with new 
hires could be negotiated as new contracts, depending on external labour market 
conditions rather than the wage of a similar worker within the firm.  This subsection 
looks at the wage setting procedure for new hires as a channel of labour adjustment.  
 
In labour economics, there are three main ways of explaining why underbidding by 
new entrants does not occur. First, legislation may keep the wage above its market 
clearing level (the minimum wage explanation). Second, firms may not accept the 
outsiders’ underbidding, since a fall in the wage may reduce productivity or increase 
the rate of labour turnover (the efficiency wage explanation). Third, it may not be in 
the insiders’ interest to permit outsider underbidding. Insiders may be able to impose 
their interests on their employers, since the insiders’ positions are protected due to   29




Table 14: Wage setting for newly hired workers 









Collective Pay agreement  5.9  35.5  11.4 
Wage of similar employees 
in firm 
55.9 42.2  53.1 
Wage of similar employees 
outside firm 
19.6 14.6  18.4 
Availability of similar 
workers in labour market 
12.5 6.1  11.2 
None of the above matters  6.4  1.6  5.4 
 100.0  100.0  100.0 
 
The results in Table 14 indicate that employing new workers on terms that deviate 
significantly from those of incumbents cannot be considered as a channel of wage 
adjustment in Irish firms. The employment conditions of similar employees in the 
firm represent the overriding determinant of wage setting for new hires. If 
underbidders approached the firm, it is unlikely that the firm would hire them on this 
basis alone. Firms avoid the potential for negative signals when setting wages for new 
hires – this is known as the adverse selection explanation for wage rigidity but also 
corresponds with efficiency wage theory.  
 
The efficiency wage theory predicts that firms have a variety of reasons (related to 
shirking, labour turnover, reciprocity, etc.) to maintain wages above the level 
consistent with full employment. This approach builds on the idea that workers’ loss 
aversion and money illusion lead to nominal rigidity in wages. Firms care about their 
internal wage structure and fair wage theories appear to be supported leading them not 
to employ underbidders (Bewley, 1999). In parallel, Solow (1990) argues that there is 
a social norm preventing the unemployed from underbidding. The idea that 
willingness to work for less than the going wage is correlated with low productivity is   30
central to the adverse selection model (Agell and Lundborg, 1995). It is also in line 
with the predictions of the insider-outsider model.  
 
Our survey evidence from Ireland shows that the lack of wage competition is a 
significant reason for the lack of wage cuts and underbidding. Workers have an 
appreciation of stable wages such that wage agreements and employment legislation 
frequently explain wage rigidity particularly for (less) skilled workers. The exception 
might be for white collar, highly skilled employees where firms report more 
discretion in setting entry salaries for new employees. These are more likely to be 
offered (and respond) to efficiency wage incentives such as flexible pay components.  
 
6. Conclusions 
The results presented in this paper are based on a survey of Irish firms undertaken as 
part of the Wage Dynamics Network (WDN), which is a Euro-system research 
network. The work was motivated by a general lack of information on wage and price 
adjustment at firm level, and, in particular, the lack of information that could be 
compared across countries on a consistent basis. The aim of the survey was to identify 
the sources and characteristics of wage and labour cost dynamics that are most 
significant for monetary policy. It also attempts to further explain the relationship 
between wages, labour costs and prices, both at the firm and macro-economic level.  
The CBFSAI carried out this coordinated survey of wage setting in Ireland in late 
2006 and early 2007.   
 
Obtaining a better understanding of the processes that determine wages is of 
considerable importance to policy makers and central banks.  Wages account for a 
significant proportion of production costs for most goods and services. The linkages 
from wages to prices (through their effect on firm pricing decisions) and from prices 
to wages (through wage bargaining and indexation) are therefore crucial components 
influencing inflation persistence and the probability of a negative wage-price spiral. 
Furthermore, the level of flexibility available to firms to reduce their labour costs is 
an indicator of how quickly an economy can adjust to negative shocks.    
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Looking at the results of the Irish survey it was found that close to two-thirds of firms 
applied at least some aspects of the national wage agreement, Towards 2016.  When 
wage agreements were made, they appear to have been applied very extensively 
throughout Irish firms, with approximately 50 per cent of firms applying the 
agreement to their entire workforce. Where there is less than a ‘blanket application’ of 
the agreement, the skill group of technically-qualified workers and supervisory staff 
are the most likely group collectively to be the exception. The most likely explanation 
for this is that this group may have been the hardest to recruit and retain and this may 
be reflected in a wage premium over the wage rate collectively agreed.  
 
Reflecting the tight labour market conditions during Celtic Tiger times, wage cuts and 
wage freezes were very infrequently used by firms over the past five years. This is not 
to say that Irish firms are in any way less flexible than their European counterparts.  
Looking at a more structural measure of flexibility, Irish firms are the least likely to 
rank regulations and collective bargaining arrangements as important reasons for 
avoiding wage cuts compared to the responses in other European countries.  This 
conclusion about the flexibility of the Irish labour market is reinforced by the reports 
of firms considering wage freezes and reductions in response to the more negative 
economic climate that has emerged since the survey was carried out (see for example 
IBEC 2009).  In all countries participating, firms had common concerns about effort, 
morale and risk of losing good employees that made them reluctant to reduce wages 
unless no alternatives were available.   
 
The results presented in this paper indicate that there are several areas where further 
research may provide useful additional information about both wage and price 
dynamics especially in changed economic times. These include the coexistence of 
price and wage rigidity placing considerable pressure on firm profit margins; job 
losses and turnover where total labour costs cannot be reduced without reducing the 
size of the labour force; and/or the scope for squeezing flexible elements of pay in 
firms’ total costs. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Size – Number of employees at the firm at the end of 2006.  For the purposes of 
analysis the firms were divided into four groups based on their employment 
level – these were micro firms (5-9 employees), small firms (10-49 
employees), medium firms (50-249 employees) and large firms (more than 
250 employees). 
Sector – refers to the main sector of activity of the firm.  Four categories are used – 
manufacturing, construction, distribution and other services. 
% Full-time - Permanent full-time workers as percentage of total workforce. 
% Part-time – Permanent part-time workers as percentage of total workforce. 
% Temporary – Temporary workers as percentage of total workforce. 
Labour turnover – Worker turnover calculated from number of number of workers 
who left the firm in 2006 (excluding maternity leave) and the number of new 
workers hired as a percentage of the total workforce. 
Vacancies – Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has unfilled vacancies and 0 
otherwise. 
% Production – Percentage of staff who are production workers, sales assistants etc.  
% Clerical – Percentage of staff working in administrative or clerical roles. 
% Technical – Percentage of technically qualified workers and supervisory staff. 
% Professional – Percentage of staff who are professionally qualified or are in 
managerial roles. 
Tenure – Distribution of employees according to length of service at the firm.  Four 
options given for the percentage of employees with less than 1 year, between 1 
and 5 years, between 6 and 10 years and more than 10 years service. 
Age of firm – Number of years the firm has been in operation. 
Labour cost share - Percentage of your firm's total costs was due to total labour costs? 
(Definition of total labour costs: wages, salaries, bonuses, social contributions, 
training, tax contributions, contributions to pension funds). 
Business cycle turnover up – qualitative indicator of firm sales/turnover in 2006 
compared to the previous year (lower, same, higher).  Dummy variable for 
higher turnover equal to 1 if turnover increased in 2006 and 0 otherwise. 
Formal process for wage negotiations – dummy variable equal to 1 if firm responds 
yes to “does your firm have a formal process for wage negotiations for 
employees by particular grades”.   35
Coverage – percentage of employees covered by formal wage negotiation process. 
National wage agreement – categorical variable for level of application of the terms 
of the national wage agreement (Towards 2016) with three possible responses: 
Apply in full, apply some aspects and do not apply it. 
Bonuses - Percentage of firm’s total wage bill in 2006 was variable, that is, not fixed 
base wages but bonuses based on individual or company performance.   
Breakdown by worker skill level (production, technical, clerical and 
professional) and bonus type (individual or company performance) provided. 
Indexation policy exists – dummy variable equal to 1 if firm has a policy that adapts 
changes in base wages to inflation. 
Indexation type – Categorical variable with four options for type of indexation 
applied: wage changes automatically linked to past inflation, wage changes 
automatically linked to expected inflation, wage changes take into account 
past inflation, wage changes take into account expected inflation. 
Frequency of wage changes by reason – Frequency (more than once a year, once a 
year, once every two years, less frequently) of wage changes for each of three 
different reasons (tenure, inflation, changes apart from tenure and inflation). 
Wages of new hires – Categorical variable indicating the most relevant factor in 
determining the wages of newly hired workers in the firm from the following 
options: collective wage agreement, wage of similar workers in the firm, wage 
of similar workers outside the firm, availability of similar workers in the 
labour market, or none of the above. 
Wage freeze – Dummy equal to 1 if firm reports having frozen base wages in previous 
five years, and 0 otherwise. 
Wage cut – Dummy equal to 1 if firm reports having cut base wages in previous five 
years, and 0 otherwise. 
Export share – percentage of sales to foreign markets. 
Wage price link – Dummy variable equal to 1 if firm indicates prices and wages are 
changed simultaneously or that a change in one directly leads to a change in 
the other.  Equal to 0 if the firm reports no particular pattern linking the 
changes. 
Competition – Measure of strength of competition as perceived by the firm: None, 
weak, strong or severe.  
   36
Appendix B: Summary Statistics 
 
Mean Std.  Dev. 
Size   210 1580 
% Full-time   81.60 23.00 
% Part-time  14.30 20.90 
% Temporary  4.10 10.10 
Labour turnover  2.70 19.50 
Vacancies   0.33 0.47 
% Production   35.40 33.20 
% Clerical   19.50 21.00 
% Technical   21.40 23.10 
% Professional   24.00 24.40 
Tenure < 1 year  19.10 20.70 
Tenure 1 - 5 years  37.40 24.90 
Tenure 6 - 10  years  20.50 19.70 
Tenure > 10 years  23.20 25.60 
Age of firm   25.50 27.30 
Labour cost share   40.60 21.00 
Business cycle turnover up   0.58 0.49 
Formal process for wage negotiations   0.24 0.43 
Coverage  83.00 23.80 
Bonuses   11.60 24.60 
Indexation policy exists   0.29 0.46 
Wage freeze  0.08 0.27 
Wage cut   0.02 0.13 
Export share  15.01 30.80 
Wage price link   1.71 1.19 
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Appendix C: Survey Questionnaire 
 
SECTION 1: WAGE-SETTING PRACTICES 
1.1  Does your firm have a formal process for wage negotiations for employees by 
particular grades? 
 Yes    2110  No       2120  )
 continue  to  1.2 
If Yes, what percentage of your total workforce is covered by these agreements?  
             percent    2111 
1.2  Does your firm apply the terms of the national wage agreement e.g. Towards 
2016?  
  Yes, we apply it in full   2210            Yes, we apply some aspects   2210     No, 
we do not apply it   2220  
1.3  How were your firm's employees distributed across the following occupational 
groups  
at the end of 2006? (An approximate breakdown is fine.) 
Low-skilled staff - Production workers, Sales assistants etc  ...............  %  1510 
Administrative/Clerical staff  ...............  %  1520 
Technically-qualified workers and supervisory staff  ...............  %  1530 
Highly-qualified employees and management  ...............  %  1540 
TOTAL     100  %   
1.4  What percentage of your total wage bill in 2006 was variable, that is, not fixed 
base wages but bonuses    based on individual or company performance? 
 
Related to individual 
performance
Related to company 
performance 
Production workers etc 
                           %
2301
                           %
2311 
Administrative/Clerical staff 
                           %
2303






                           %
  2302 
 
                           %





                           %
  2304 
 
                           %
  2314 
1.5  Does your firm have a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation? 
Base wages are regular wages and salaries including commission and piecework 
payments but excluding bonuses. 
 Yes    2401   ) continue to 1.6     38
 No    2402   ) continue to 1.7 
 
1.6  If yes in 1.5, please choose among the options below 
•  Wage changes are automatically linked to:     
- past  inflation  ........................................................................    2511 
- expected  inflation  ................................................................    2512 
•  Wages changes take into account, without any formal rule: 
- past  inflation  ........................................................................    2521 
- expected  inflation  ................................................................    2522 
1.7  Consider the largest occupational group in your firm (as identified in Question 
1.4). How frequently is the base wage of this group typically changed in your 
firm? 
  (Please tick one answer for each line)  
  More than  Once  Once every  Less
 Never/   
  once a year  a year  two years frequently
 Don’t  Know 
  than once 
   every  two 
years 
•  wage changes apart from tenure and inflation .    2611 .........    2612...   2613 ......... 
  2614 ................................................................................................   2615 ............  
•  wage changes due to tenure  ............................    2621 .........    2622...   2623 ......... 
  2624 ................................................................................................   2625 ............  
•  wage changes due to inflation  ..........................    2631 .........    2632...   2633 ......... 
  2634 ................................................................................................   2635 
1.8  Under normal circumstances, are wage changes concentrated in typical months? 
• no  ................................................    2710 
•  yes, indicate the month(s)     
Jan  Feb  Mar  Apr  May  Jun  Jul  Aug  Sep  Oct   Nov  Dec   
 01     02  03  04    05   06  07  08  09  10  11  12  272
1.9  Considering the largest occupational group in your firm (as identified in 
Question 1.4) please indicate among the following options which is the most 
relevant factor in determining the entry wage of newly hired employees in your 
firm?  (Please tick one box.) 
 
•  collective wage agreement (at any level) ..............    2810 
•  wage of similar employees in the firm .....................   2820 
•  wage of similar workers outside the firm .................   2830 
• availability  of  similar  workers in the labour market ..   2840 
•  None of the above matters  ......................................   2850 
 
 
Tenure is length of service at your firm   39
SECTION 2: WAGE FLEXIBILITY 
2.1  Over the last five years, has the base wage (i.e. bonuses excluded) in your firm 
ever been frozen or cut? 
• frozen: 
- no  .............                 3111
-  yes ...........    for  _____  % of workforce       3112 
• cut: 
- no  .............                3121
-  yes ...........    for  _____  % of workforce       3122 
 
2.2  There can be various reasons as to why base wages are not, or only very slightly 
cut, even if your firm needs to reduce labour costs. Please indicate their 
relevance in your company.  
(Please tick one answer for each line) 









It is impeded by labour regulation/ collective 
agreements………………………………………
          3301
It would have a negative impact on 
employees’ morale……………………………... 
          3302
It would have a negative impact on 
employees’ efforts, resulting in less output….. 
          3303
It would have a negative impact on the firm’s 
reputation as an employer…………………….. 
          3304
It would mean that the best employees would 
leave the firm…………………………………… 
          3305
It would imply high costs of hiring and training 
new employees………………………………… 
          3306
It would create difficulties in attracting new 
workers………………………………………….. 
          3307
Workers dislike unpredictable reductions in 
income…………………………………………… 
          3308
Employees are concerned with how their 
wage compares to that of similar workers in 
other firms in the same market………………..            3309  40
2.3  Other than cut/freeze base wages, have you used any of the following strategies 
to reduce labour costs? (Select all options that apply to your firm)  
Recruited new employees at lower wage level than those who left voluntarily ............   ............    3401 
Encouraged early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with lower 
wages ...............................................................................   3402 
Reduced or eliminated bonus payments ...........................  ....  ..............  ....  ...................  ..............   3403 
Reduced or eliminated non pay benefits ...........................  ....  ..............  ....  ...................  ..............   3404 
Changes shift assignments or shift premia........................  ....  ..............  ....  ...................  ..............   3405 
Slow or freeze rate at which promotions are filled .............  ....  ..............  ....  ...................  ..............   3406 
Never tried to reduce labour costs / Not applicable ...........  ....  ..............  ....  ...................  ..............   3407 
2.4  How does your firm react to an unanticipated slowdown in demand?   
    (Please tick a box for each line). 









   Increase selling prices ...........................  ..   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3710 
   Reduce  profit  margins  ...........................    ..   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3720 
   Reduce  output  .......................................    ..   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3730 
   Reduce  other  costs  ..................................   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3740 
 
 
2.5    If the reduction of costs was of relevance in your answer to 
question 2.4, please indicate the main channel through which this goal is 
achieved: 
  (Indicate the most important factor only.) 
Reduce base wages ...........................................................   .................  ....  ............ 
 .... 3510 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits etc.) ...  ............ 
 .... 3520 
Reduce the number of regular employees ..........................   .................  ....  .......... 
 .... 3530 
Reduce the number of temporary employees/other types of workers....  ....  .......... 
 .... 3540 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee ..............   .................  ....  .......... 
 .... 3550 
Reduce non-labour costs (Specify ___________________)    .................  ....  .......... 
 .... 3560 
 
 
Examples could include advertising, R&D, travel, training, IT, overheads 
If ticked for “reduce other costs” continue to question 2.5   41
2.6  How does your firm react to an unanticipated increase in the cost of an 
intermediate input (e.g. an oil price increase) affecting all firms in the 
market? 
(Please tick a box for each line.) 









   Increase selling prices ...........................  ..   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3610 
   Reduce  profit  margins  ...........................    ..   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3620 
   Reduce  output  .......................................    ..   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3630 
   Reduce  other  costs  ..................................   ..............   .............   ..............   .................  3640 
 
 
2.7  If the reduction of costs was of relevance in your answer to Question 2.6, 
please indicate the main channel through which this goal is achieved:  
(Indicate the most important factor only.) 
Reduce flexible wage components (for example bonuses, benefits etc.)  ..  ..............     3121 
Reduce the number of regular employees ..........................    ....    ...........  ................     3122 
Reduce the number of temporary employees/other types of workers....  ....  ............     3123 
Adjust the number of hours worked per employee ..............    ....   ............  ................     3124 
          Reduce non-labour costs (for example ___________________) ..........  ....  ............     3125 
 
 
SECTION 3: PRICE SETTING AND PRICE CHANGES 
The price should refer to the main product or service (i.e. the one that generated the 
highest fraction of turnover in the last year) 
3.1  What share of your firm's turnover generated by your main product/service in 
2006 was due to:   
Sales or service in the domestic market  ...............  %  4110 
Sales or service in other EU countries  ...............  %  4120 
Sales or service in countries outside the EU  ...............  %  4130 
TOTAL     100  %   
3.2  How does your firm set its price for its main product or service on its main 
market? 
(Please tick only one answer)
•  We do not have an autonomous price setting policy because: 
-  the price is regulated, or it is set by a parent company/group ..........   4210 
-  the price is set by our main customer(s) ..........................................   4220 
•  We do set our price ourselves but following our competitor(s) ..............   4230 
•  We set our price fully according to our costs and a completely 
 self-determined  profit  margin  ................................................................   4240 
•  Other (please specify)................................................................... .........   4250 
Examples could include advertising, R&D, travel, training, IT, overheads 
If ticked for “reduce other costs” continue to question 2.7  42
3.3  To what extent do you experience competition for your main product/service? 
(Please tick only one answer)
Severe   Strong    Weak  No  I don’t 
competition competition    competition  competition  know 
  4310  4320      4330  4340   4350 
3.4      Suppose that your main competitor for your main product/service decreases 
their prices; how likely is your firm to react by decreasing your price? 
  (Please tick only one answer)   
Very likely   Likely   Not likely   Not at all   Doesn't 
apply/Don't know   
   4410  4420   4430  4440 
  4450 
3.5  Under normal circumstances, how often does the price of your main 
product/service change in your firm? (Please tick only one answer)   
Daily  4510 Weekly  4520 Monthly  4530 Quarterly  4540    Twice a year 4550
Once a year  4560 Every  two  years  4570  Less frequently than 
once every two years  4580 
Never  4590  There is not a defined pattern 4591 
3.6  Are price changes concentrated in typical months?
• no   ............... 4610  
•  yes, indicate the month(s) 
Jan   Feb   Mar   Apr   May   Jun   Jul   Aug  Sep   Oct   Nov   Dec   
 01     02  03  04    05   06  07  08  09  10  11  12  462
3.7  How does the timing of price changes for your main product relate to that of 
wage changes? 
(Please tick only one answer) 
There is no link ..  ..............  .......................................  4710  
There is no particular pattern ....................................  4720  
Decisions are taken simultaneously ..........................  4730 
Price changes tend to follow wage changes .  ...........  4740 
Wage changes tend to follow price changes .  ...........  4750 
 Don’t  know  ................................................................  4760  
 
SECTION 4: INFORMATION ABOUT THE FIRM 
4.1  How many people did your firm employ at the end of 2006? Include 
owners/directors/managers working at your firm. 
   total numbers 
employed in your firm  1100   43
  Of these, approximately what percentage are:  Percent   
         
permanent full-time  ...............  %  1101 
permanent part-time  ...............  %  1102 
temporary (incl. apprenticeships and students)  ...............  %  1103 
TOTAL  100  %   
Other types of workers (e.g. people employed by 
agencies, consultants, etc.)  ...............  %  1104 
4.2  How many employees stopped working at your firm during 2006 (not including 
maternity leave, etc)? 
4.3  How many new employees (including replacements) did your firm hire during 
2006?    
1300 
4.4  Do you currently have vacancies at your firm?  
 Yes   1410   No     1420  )  continue to 4.5 
  If Yes, how many full-time vacancies exist at your firm?       
1430 
4.5  What is the main activity of your business or organisation? 
 
 
4.6  What percentage of your total workforce is currently on or close to (within 10%) 
the National Minimum Wage of 8.65 euro per hour?   
  1  
percent  1700 
4.7  Approximately, how were your firm’s employees distribted according to length of 
service (tenure) at your firm at the end of 2006? 
less than 1 year  ...............  %  1810 
between 1 and 5 years  ...............  %  1820 
between 6 and 10 years  ...............  %  1830 
more than 10 years  ...............  %  1840 
TOTAL    100  %   
4.8  What was the first year of operation of your firm? (Give earliest year in the event 
of mergers, etc). 
                                                                                                 1900 
4.9  Considering your last profit and loss account, what percentage of your firm's 
total costs was due to total labour costs? (Definition of total labour costs: wages,   44
salaries, bonuses, social contributions, training, tax contributions, contributions 
to pension funds).    (An approximate answer will be fine.) 
   percent  111
4.10  How was your firm's sales/turnover in 2006 compared to the previous year? 
(Please tick only one answer).   
much lower  1111  lower  1112  approximately the same  1113  higher  1114  much higher  1
 
OPTIONAL - DETAILS CONCERNING THE PERSON WHO FILLED UP THE FORM: 
 -  Name:
 ........................................................................................................................... 
 -  Position:
 ........................................................................................................................... 
 -  Telephone  number:
 ........................................................................................................................... 
  - E-mail (the results of the survey will be sent to this address):  
   ...................................................................................................................... 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION 
 